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INTRODUCTION
Economic historians have said that "America is the Ca-
naan of capitalism, its promised land" where the tendencies of
western capitalism could find fullest expression.1 One essential
requirement for the continued success of American capitalism
is a civil justice system that provides a fair and trusted forum
for all parties seeking timely redress of economic disputes.
Beginning in kindergarten, American children start each
day with a Pledge of Allegiance, ending with the words "with
liberty and justice for all." The current economic reality is that
civil justice in America has become a "pay to play" process.
With few exceptions, it does not function fairly or effectively
unless each side of a dispute has enough capital to pay the very
substantial cost of full participation.
The United States is experiencing a high degree of wealth
and resource inequality among its citizens. There can be no
'justice for all' unless each side of an economic dispute can
aggregate the capital needed to 'play.' It is not surprising that
those with the greatest concentration of wealth experience dis-
comfort when natural economic forces generate funding solu-
tions for their less affluent, potential adversaries enabling
them equal access to the field of 'play.'
This paper views civil litigation initiated by a party seeking
money damages through the lens of the underlying economics
that impact the civil justice system's ability to achieve fair out-
comes. It examines how access to capital has impacted the
functioning of civil justice in the United States.
1. William N. Parker, Historiography of American Economic History, in ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY, 6 (Glenn Porter, ed., Scribner's
1980).
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Participation and success in any endeavor seeking profit
or economic gain in the American capitalist system requires a
sufficient supply of the three basic economic elements: prop-
erty, labor, and capital. 2 The evolution of each of these ele-
ments as applied to civil litigation and the parties and lawyers
seeking gain or profit has brought us to the current state of
justice in America. Just as horses and buggy whips have given
way to engines and motors as major economic drivers, vast de-
velopments in our capitalistic society have served as catalysts
for change in the U.S. common law legal system and reshaped
the nature and interplay of the required resources of property,
labor, and capital within that system.
The paper will demonstrate that non-party litigation fund-
ing is a natural and healthy capitalistic response to the
changes that have occurred in the economy and in civiljustice.
We examine the historical development of the three economic
elements, property, labor and capital, in the context of one
economic endeavor, a lawsuit in which at least one party-and
all of the lawyers-seek economic gain as the objective, and
how the developments have increased the need for capital in-
vestment.
I.
PROPERTY-THE FIRST ECONOMIC ELEMENT
The first major economic element required to successfully
engage in the civil justice system is property. Our system of
civil justice has its underpinning in the 'common law,' created
in England during the Middle Ages as an orderly system to
adjudicate disputes. Integral to the development of the 'com-
mon law' was the creation of a new form of intangible property
right named a 'chose in action.' The word 'chose' was taken
from the French word, meaning 'thing.'
This unique property right has evolved over time into dis-
cretely named segments but, in essence, the chose in action
property right has remained a core element of the common
law for over four hundred years. The founders of the United
States embraced English common law and enshrined it, along
2. See PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMics: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYsIS (19th
ed. 2009). In 1970, Samuelson became the first American to win the Nobel
Prize in Economic Science.
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with the right to trial by jury, in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of
Rights:
Amendment VII
In suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law.
The ownership rights of a chose in action are exercised by
seeking legal redress to obtain money or property, economic
gain or profit, through a system of civil justice. 3 It has evolved
in the United States through the creation and reshaping of
complex and structured sets of rules and processes and main-
taining a forum for the exercise of this special property right,
our courts.4
A. Case Law and Legal Procedures Have Increased Risk and Cost
in Exercising Chose in Action
Over 150 years ago, the U.S. civil justice system began of-
fering a standardized and simple format for asserting a chose
in action and commencing a lawsuit; "Notice Pleading." In a
series of decisions over the past twenty years, U.S. courts have
imposed hurdles for the owners of a chose in action, i.e. plain-
tiffs, to assert and pursue claims at every stage of civil litiga-
tion. From the erosion of 'Notice Pleading,' to increased use
of summary judgment, to heightened class action and expert
witness admission requirements, it has become increasingly
difficult and economically risky for owners of a chose in action
to assert their property rights. These hurdles have increased
the amount of capital required to mount a lawsuit and exer-
cise a chose in action. Rather than enhancing 'justice for all,"
these court decisions have closed the courthouse doors and
reduced access to justice for those who are not the very
wealthy in our society, unless they can find a source of capital
willing to share the increased risk.
3. See generally W.S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in
Action by the Common Law, 33 HARv. L. REv. 997 (1920).
4. All states have adopted the English common law system, with the ex-
ception of Louisiana, which borrowed from the Roman civil law tradition to
create analogous "litigious rights." LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2652 (1995).
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1. Establishment and Erosion of Notice Pleading
In 1848, the dawn of the industrial era in the United
States, David Dudly Field created the first formal code of civil
procedure. It was enacted in New York and later adopted by
most states. The 'Field Code,' as it was known, established a
uniform set of rules and procedures for asserting a chose in
action. They begin with a written pleading to the court, called
a 'complaint,' containing a simple, concise statement setting
forth only the facts of the dispute. This paradigm of uniformity
and simplification in asserting a chose in action became
known as Notice Pleading.5
In 1938, the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted in part "to lower barriers to filing lawsuits and pursu-
ing discovery to support a claim in the federal court system." 6
Under the federal courts' version of 'Notice Pleading,' the
newly adopted Federal Rules enabled the owner of a chose in
action to pursue a lawsuit by alleging ultimate facts with no
need for great specificity. Thus, the fleshing out of facts in the
case was to be done during post-pleading discovery.
Notice Pleading in both the states' and federal civil justice
systems ultimately ensured that plaintiffs could have their day
in court. Under the prevailing rules, motions to dismiss a com-
plaint, the claimant's articulation of the chose in action, would
only be granted if it appeared "beyond doubt" that plaintiffs
can prove "no set of facts" in support of their claims which
would entitle them to relief. 7 The establishment of Notice
Pleading made the exercise of chose in action property rights
less complex, less labor intensive for the lawyer, less vulnerable
to attack, and less costly.
Things began to change significantly in 2007 under the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.
The Court in Twombly effectively overruled nearly fifty years of
Notice Pleading under Conley v. Gibson, by requiring plaintiffs
to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face." In 2009, the Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal raised the
5. WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAw, (2d ed. 2008).
6. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Why Heightened Pleading-Why Now?, 114 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1247, 1249-50 (2010).
7. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atlan-
tic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
8. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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bar again by allowing the court to disregard conclusory state-
ments and focus solely on factual allegations. 9 Where Notice
Pleading had once allowed plaintiffs to provide a "short and
plain statement of the claim," 10 plaintiffs are now required to
allege specific facts that, oftentimes, are only learned later
through discovery. 11 Indeed, plaintiffs may now have to forego
their claims entirely under this new standard "either because
they lack the resources to engage in extensive pre-filing investi-
gation or because of informational asymmetries" between the
parties. 12 The heightened pleading standard essentially func-
tions as a "brick in the wall blocking access to civil justice and
jury trial."'13
A recent study has found that Iqba's impact on federal
pleading practice and asserting a chose in action is "undenia-
ble.' 4 Those who do file suit face additional costs as they re-
spond to increasingly successful Federal Rule 12(b) (6) mo-
tions to dismiss the case. The percentage of 12(b) (6) motions
granted in full with leave to amend increased from 6% under
Conley, to 9% under Twombly, to 21% under Iqbal. The percent-
age of motions denied fell from 26% under Con/ey, to 23%
9. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
10. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
11. Sasha Nichols, Note, Access to Cash, Access to Court: Unlocking the Court-
room Doors with Third-Party Litigation Finance, 5 U.C. IRvINE L. REv. 197, 202
(2015).
12. Whether the Supreme Court Has Limited Americans'Access to Court: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 16 (2009) [hereinafter Ameri-
cans'Access to Court] (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Profes-
sor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania) ( "Few is-
sues in civil procedure jurisprudence are more significant than pleading
standards, which are the key that opens access to courts."); see also Arthur R.
Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing? What's Happened to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 587, 596-97 (2011) (using an
employment discrimination case to exemplify the problem of information
asymmetry: "The plaintiff has been fired. One of the first rules of discharg-
ing someone is don't tell the employee why he or she is being fired. If facts
must be pleaded to state a claim for discriminatory discharge or failure to
promote or some other nefarious practice, how can the plaintiff surmount
the newly minted pleading requirement? How does the plaintiff show dis-
criminatory conduct let alone a pattern of discrimination-whether it's race,
gender, age, or disability-without access to the history of the employer's con-
duct regarding other employees?").
13. Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal's
Impact on Rule 12(b) (6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REv. 603, 652 (2012).
14. Id. at 609.
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under Twombly, to 17% under Iqbal.15 The study also found the
type of claim impacted the likelihood of success: for constitu-
tional civil rights claims, motions to dismiss with and without
leave to amend were granted 41% of the time under Conley,
compared to 64% of the time under Iqbal; for ERISA and FLSA
claims, 37% were granted under Conley, compared to 60%
under Iqbal; for consumer credit claims, 36% were granted
under Conley, compared to 72% under Iqbal.16 Interestingly,
the study further found that class actions are almost four times
more likely to be entirely dismissed than non-class actions,
demonstrating the impact that the heightened pleading stan-
dard has on individuals whose only economically viable re-
course is to pursue claims collectively.1 7
While there is conflicting data about whether plaintiffs
and/or their counsel are now spending more money in con-
ducting pre-filing background investigations to survive poten-
tial 12(b) (6) motions, there is little doubt that these motions
create significant delay, raise the risk of initiating a successful
case and increase the cost of pursuing a claim. In other words,
the heightened pleading standard has increased the amount
of needed capital and its risk-adjusted cost, as economists
would predict. In addition, these changes in pleading stan-
dards, the potential success rate of motions to dismiss, and law-
yer hourly billings generated by such work together have en-
couraged defendants and their lawyers, on both a legal and
economic benefits basis, to make such motion practices rou-
tine. This practice undoubtedly generates increased workload
and costs for the courts as well.
2. Increase in Summary Judgment Motions
The now seemingly inevitable summary judgment mo-
tion18 has become a tool for defendants to "win without the
15. Id. at 614.
16. Id. at 626-27.
17. Id. at 626.
18. See Corina Gerety, Trial Bench Views: Findings from a National Survey on
Civil Procedure, 2010 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS.
40-41 (noting that two-thirds of federal judges agree that summary judg-
ment motions are filed "in almost every case"); Summary of Results of Federal
Judicial Center Survey of NELA Members, 2010 NAT'L EMP'T LAWYERS ASS'N. 7
[hereinafter NELA Survey] (showing survey respondents faced motions for
summary judgment in nearly every case that they filed).
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risk of losing."'19 Summary judgment is used far more by de-
fendants than plaintiffs, and judges routinely grant summary
judgment motions for defendants, but not for plaintiffs. 20
Thus, a typical litigation strategy has emerged for defendants
to go through pre-trial discovery in the hope of winning at the
summary judgment phase, then settling immediately if sum-
mary judgment is not granted. 2' This strategy is economically
beneficial to defense attorneys, as they typically bill by the
hour for discovering the information necessary to bring the
motion. 22 Given that these motions are successful less than
half of the time,23 a real strategic advantage for defendants
can be seen in terms of increased cost to plaintiffs in opposing
the motion, and from the resulting delay. 24 The longer the
case goes on, the more it costs and the longer the plaintiffs'
economic damage underlying the chose in action remains
unaddressed, the less likely it is that plaintiffs can pursue wor-
19. John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 CEO. WASH. L. REv.
522, 526 (2007) (arguing that the civil justice system will "enjoy a net benefit
from abolishing summary judgment, in terms of both efficiency and fair-
ness").
20. See Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading and the Future of
TranssubstantiveProcedure, 43 AKRON L. REv. 1189, 1189 (noting that the orig-
inal Advisory Committee envisioned that Rule 56 would "prove useful chiefly
for plaintiffs seeking to collect debts"); Richard L. Steagall, The Recent Explo-
sion in Summary Judgments Entered by the Federal Courts Has Eliminated the Juy
from the Judicial Power, 33 S. ILL. U. LJ. 469, 470 (2009) (stating that 1.7% of
federal civil cases were tried in 2005, a dramatic decrease from 19.9% at the
time the Federal Rules were adopted).
21. Bronsteen, supra note 19, at 530.
22. Corina D. Gerety & Brittany K.T. Kauffman, Summary of Empirical Re-
search on the CivilJustice Process: 2008-2013, 2014 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF THE Am. LEGAL Sys. 26 (stating that "[f]rom a revenue generation per-
spective, defense attorneys nationwide attributed half of their firm's civil liti-
gation practice to discovery (at the median)").
23. See D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judg-
ment, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 875, 901 (2006) (estimating from available empirical
studies that the overall success rate for summary judgment motions ranged
from 20% to 40%).
24. See NELA Survey, supra note 18, at 38 (showing 91.5% of respondents
agreed that summary judgment motions are used as a tactical tool, 88.1%
agreed that summary judgment motions increase cost and delay without pro-
portionate benefit, and 70% agreed that judges routinely fail to rule on sum-
mary judgment motions); Civil Case Processing in the Fcderal District Conas,
2009 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys. 51 (finding average
time from filing to resolution of motions for summaryjudgment across eight
districts to be 166 days, or approximately six months).
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thy cases to their conclusion without a non-party source of cap-
ital.25
3. Increasing Case Costs
Case cost escalation is another hurdle to justice, and in
many instances prevents attorneys from helping potential
plaintiffs pursue meritorious claims.26 In addition to the capi-
tal necessary to operate a law firm, capital is required to fund
court fees, discovery costs, and expert witness fees.2 7 For those
attorneys who are financially able to take a case on a contin-
gent or blended fee basis and also bear these costs, they are, in
effect, loaning both the labor and the capital required to help
plaintiffs pursue their economic rights. These costs have been
on the rise, particularly with the advent of electronic discov-
ery.28 Cases involving requests for electronic data generate
costs for collecting, reviewing, and producing data.
2 9 Of
course, the cost of production depends not only on the type of
case, but also on the amount of data collected. Before the ad-
vent of technology that created immense stores of electronic
data, these costs and the means of mining the information for
relevant case information did not exist. Over the last decade
or so, the growth in the use of computers and other forms of
electronic media has dramatically increased the amount of
data generated and collected. One study from 2012 found that
total costs of production ranged from $17,000 in an intellec-
tual property matter to $27 million in a products liability case,
with a median value of $1.8 million dollars. 30
25. Member Survey on Civil Practice: Full Report, 2009 Am. BAR ASS'N SEC.
LITIG., 2 [hereinafter ABA Survey].
26. See id., at 9 (90% of plaintiffs' attorneys stated that their firms are
likely to turn away cases that are not cost-effective).
27. See Nichols, supra note 11, at 207 (noting that the combination of
these fees "has created whatJudge Richard Posner termed 'a liquidity prob-
lem,' in which plaintiffs with potentially meritorious claims cannot afford to
bring those claims to court due to capital constraints").
28. See Electronic Discovery: A View from the Front Lines, 2008 INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys. 3-4 (estimating e-discovery costs to be
about $3.5 million for a typical, mid-size lawsuit).
29. See Nicholas M. Pace & Laura Zakaras, Where the Money Goes: Under-
standing Litigant Expenditures for Producing Electronic Discovery, 2012 RAND
INST. FOR CrWLJUSTICE 19-20 (estimating expenditures of $40k per gigabyte
of information produced and $18k per gigabyte of information reviewed).
30. Id. at 17.
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In addition, expert witness fees are on the rise. A recent
survey of over one thousand experts found that 66% of experts
had raised their rates in the previous five years.31 The average
hourly rate charged for case review and preparation was $333.
The average hourly rate for testifying in court was $451.32 Ex-
perts who testify on behalf of plaintiffs are significantly more
likely to require an up-front retainer, often times at least par-
tially non-refundable; the average retainer was $3048, an in-
crease of 17% from five years ago.3 3 It is easy to see how un-
wieldy these costs can become, and why these fees influence
settlement decisions,3 4 many times to the economic detriment
of a plaintiff (and the plaintiffs lawyer), who lack sufficient
capital to see a case through to the finish line.
4. Heightened Class Action Requirements
The class action lawsuit "was an invention of equity,
mothered by the practical necessity of providing a procedural
device so that mere numbers would not disable large groups of
individuals, united in interest, from enforcing their equitable
rights nor grant them immunity from their equitable
wrongs."35 The device that was once seen as a "salutary tool for
the administration of justice" is now increasingly viewed with
disfavor,3 6 flying in the face of our national goal of 'justice for
all." This disfavor has led to amendments to Federal Rule 23
and a series of court decisions that have undermined plain-
tiffs' ability to bring and maintain collective exercise of rights
in class action lawsuits.
The adoption of Federal Rule 23(f) in 1998, that permits
immediate appeal of a federal trial court's certification of a
31. Survey of Expert Witnesses, Aggregate Results, 2014 SEAK, INC. (on file
with authors) [hereinafter SEAK Survey].
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Expert Witness Fees: How Much Does an Expert Witness Cost?,
SFAK EXPERT WITNESS DmEcroRv, http://blog.seakexperts.com/expert-wit-
ness-fees-how-much-does-an-expert-witness-cost/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
34. SeeABA Survey, supra note 25, at 158 (stating 85.1% of plaintiffs' law-
yers find expert witness costs important or very important to the ultimate
decision to settle); NELA Survey, supra note 18, at 44 (stating 81.1% of plain-
tiffs lawyers find these costs somewhat important or very important).
35. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir.
1948).
36. Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REv.
729, 732 (2013).
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"class" at an early stage in the case, and the Class Action Fair-
ness Act in 2005 "have altered the procedural landscape" in
favor of defendants. 37 The majority of sizable class actions are
now brought in federal court and more class certification deci-
sions are being reviewed by appellate courts.38 One scholar ex-
amined all Rule 23(f) appeals accepted over a fourteen-year
period and found that 69% were appeals by defendants imme-
diately after the grant of class certification, whereas only 31%
were appeals by plaintiffs after the denial of class certification.
Of those appeals, defendants were successful 70% of the time,
compared with plaintiffs, who prevailed only 30% of the
time.39 If the class is unable to pass the certification hurdle, "it
represents another way of destroying the economic viability of
a litigation and effectively terminating it short of a merit adju-
dication.'"40
With the increased number of appeals filed at the inter-
mediate appellate and Supreme Court levels, new standards
have emerged that, not unlike the heightened pleading stan-
dards, have raised evidentiary burdens for plaintiffs. For many
years, most courts permitted plaintiffs to seek class certifica-
tion based on the pleadings. When evaluating a motion for
class certification, courts accepted all well-pleaded facts as
true.41 Indeed, numerous courts interpreted the Supreme
Court's decision in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin4 2 to mean that
courts did not have the authority to inquire into the merits of
a suit to determine if the suit could be maintained as a class
action.43 Since 2001, several federal circuit courts and the Su-
preme Court have ultimately rejected this interpretation of Ei-
sen, in favor of allowing an examination of evidence and reso-
lution of conflicting evidence bearing on the merits at the
early class certification stage of the case. 44
Plaintiffs face additional procedural hurdles and costs at
the class certification phase after the Supreme Court's deci-
37. Id. at 732-33.
38. Id. at 733.
39. Id. at 741.
40. Miller, supra note 12, at 593 (stating further "[t]he class certification
motion thus has become yet another pretrial procedural stop sign!").
41. Klonoff, supra note 36, at 747.
42. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
43. Id. at 748.
44. Id. at 748-51.
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sion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, which heightened Federal
Rule 23's class "commonality" requirement. 45 Prior to Dukes,
commonality had been seen as relatively easy to satisfy, requir-
ing each class member to assert claims that share legal or fac-
tual issues with one another.46 Post Dukes, commonality re-
quires that plaintiffs "have suffered the same injury," their
claims must depend upon a "common contention," which
"must be of such a nature that it is capable of class wide resolu-
tion-which means that determination of its truth or falsity
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of
the claims in one stroke. '47
It is too early to assess the full impact of Dukes. At the very
least, the Court "turned a minimal requirement into one that
could significantly impact class certification, especially in the
(b) (2) context," in which the class is seeking to have the court
grant the class members injunctive relief.48 One scholar has
argued that the decision casts "further doubt on the deterrent
function of the class action. '49 Because Dukes has eliminated
the possibility of combining injunctive relief with an individual
award of damages in a single class action under (b) (2), the
prospects for recovery of attorneys' fees will also diminish. 50
Another risk to lawyers taking class action cases is the
emergence of an objector class of lawyers, whose practice is to
attack class action settlements by signing up a class member
and filing objections. These objections rarely bear fruit for an-
yone but the objecting lawyers, who often extract payment
(one might say a tax) from the plaintiffs' class counsel, as a
condition for dropping objections and enabling the class
members and their counsel to obtain the remaining economic
benefit of the settlement. The decline in recoverable fees and
the increased cost and risks have reduced the incentive for
plaintiffs' attorneys to bring class actions, 51 and, unless a ro-
45. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556-57 (2011).
46. A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and
Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 441, 443 (2013).
47. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
48. Klonoff, supra note 36, at 780.
49. George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the
Deterrent Class Action, 98 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 24, 24 (2012).
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id.
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bust source of capital emerges, will significantly narrow the
ranks of lawyers financially capable of taking them.
5. Increased Cost and Challenges of Using Experts
Expert testimony is critical to evaluating the merits of both in-
dividual and collective actions, and is required when the out-
come of a case goes beyond the lay knowledge of the jury.52
Experts are used in cases ranging from automobile accidents,
to medical malpractice, to products liability, to intellectual
property infringement, to accounting fraud. The admissibility
of expert testimony, however, is increasingly unpredictable af-
ter the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.53 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.
54
For sixty years prior to Daubert, scientific testimony needed to
"be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance"
in its particular field. 55 After Daubert, courts must now deter-
mine "whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scien-
tific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand or determine a fact in issue."'56 The Daubert court pro-
vided a list of non-exclusive factors to assist in making this
determination: (1) whether the theory can be, and has been,
tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been sub-
jected to peer review and publication; (3) consideration of the
known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the method-
ology or technique has achieved "general acceptance" in the
relevant scientific community. 57 The Kumho decision extended
Daubert's reach to all expert testimony. The Court in Kumho
cautioned trial courts "to make certain that an expert, whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experi-
ence, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the rele-
vant field."58 Granting judges, learned in legal principles, wide
discretion in evaluating complex scientific, technical and eco-
52. Kari Thorsvold, Guarding the Gate to Expert Testimony: Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael and State v. Council, 51 S.C. L. REV. 965, 965 (2000).
53. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
54. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
55. Richard T. Stilwell, Kumho Tire: The Battle of the Experts Continues, 19
Rizv. LITIG. 193, 195 (2000).
56. Id. at 196 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
57. Id. at 196-97.
58. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
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nomic teachings and opinions, has increased unpredictability.
"[T]he lack of an objective standard, combined with a mini-
mum standard for the scientific proficiency of litigators and
judges, defies a basic goal of the law, namely to make the out-
come of a Daubert hearing predictable. '59
These decisions have turned the court into an assessor of
evidentiary validity and a gatekeeper of evidence in fields of
learning in which they are not schooled. Before testimony may
be admitted, courts screen every expert, adding "another pro-
cedural obstacle, another motion, another hearing, and an-
other way a plaintiff can get tripped up short of trial."6 As a
practical matter, if a defendant is successful in eliminating a
plaintiff's expert, "a mortal blow has been struck," positioning
the case for summary judgment. 61
As a matter of intellectual inquiry, one wonders whether
the learned and well-meaning judges who erected these barri-
ers for asserting a chose in action gave much thought to the
economic impact their decisions would have on the plaintiffs
seeking to exercise a chose in action and these plaintiffs' ac-
cess to the justice system. It would be surprising if the judges
fully considered how the increased legal and economic risks
would inevitably produce a source of needed capital to pursue
a worthy chose in action and how the increased risk would in-
evitably drive up the cost of that capital as an added burden on
obtaining justice.
II.
LABOR-THE SECOND ECONOMIC ELEMENT
A. Law Firm Evolution and the Economy
The second major economic element required to success-
fully engage in the civil justice system is labor. That means law-
yers. Unless an owner of a chose in action is foolish enough to
act as their own representative, our civil justice system has cre-
ated an economic monopoly, requiring that only licensed law-
yers be permitted to provide the labor component. The cost of
paying a lawyer to pursue a civil case and a law firm's overhead
59. Thorsvold, supra note 52, at 975 (quoting Marilee M. Kapsa & Carl B.
Meyer, Scientific Experts: Making Their Testimony More Reliable, 35 CAL. W. L.
REv. 313, 331 (1999)).
60. Miller, supra note 12, at 592-93.
61. Id. at 593.
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costs in handling a case are significant, thus requiring a source
of ready capital. This key economic element, labor (the law-
yers and the law firms), has evolved materially since the estab-
lishment of the chose in action in the Middle Ages. This evolu-
tion began to accelerate along with the rest of the U.S. econ-
omy at the dawn of the industrial era and has changed even
faster with the creation of the digital economy and the global-
ization of the business markets that many lawyers serve.
The legal sector of the U.S. economy is impacted by the
overall health and growth of the economy as a whole. Histori-
cally, lawyers in America were not employed by others or de-
pendent on others for help providing legal services.6 2 The
evolution of the legal profession from the paradigm of the
solo practitioners and the catalyst for the emergence and
growth of the law firm, as an economic entity, can be traced to
the end of the Civil War, the development of railroads in the
United States, and the beginning of the industrialization of
the United States economy.63 It was not until the late 1800's
that law firms existed in the United States at all.64 As late as
1872 there were only fourteen law firms in the United States
with more than four lawyers, three of which had as many as
five lawyers and only one had six. 65 In 1880, at the dawn of the
U.S. industrial economy, there were 64,000 lawyers in
America. 6 By the end of World War II, seventy-five years later,
that number had grown to 200,000. By 2015, seventy years af-
ter the end of World War II, the number of U.S. lawyers had
grown to 1.3 million.6 7
Not surprisingly, the period since the end of World War II
has seen the emergence of larger and larger law firms to meet
the demands of growing U.S. national and global economic
marketplaces. Though law practice is viewed as a profession, it
must also work as a business.
As of 2000, U.S. lawyers had established over 47,500 law
firms, with 1% of the profession practicing in law firms with
62. Legal Education and Professional Development... an Educational Contin-
uum: Report of The Tash Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the
Gap, 1992 Am. BAR ASS'N SEC. LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS, 29.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. National Lawyer Population Survey 1878-2015, 2015 AM. BAR ASS'N.
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more than 100 lawyers.68 As of 2015, there were 400 law firms
with 100 or more lawyers in the United States, and 88 law firms
with more than 500 lawyers.6 9 The evolution of ever-larger le-
gal practice settings has produced enormous professional ser-
vice businesses with unstable business assets and professionally-
imposed constraints on capital raising that are not present in
the industrial companies that they serve.
With the globalization of the economy, the legal profes-
sion has confronted dramatic market changes and enormous
economic challenges that have driven law firms to consoli-
date. 70 The stresses of consolidation and the severe economic
downturn in 2008 have conspired to make law firms less eco-
nomically stable, riskier, and less creditworthy than ever
before. 7 1 The high cost of forming and operating a law prac-
tice, together with the burden of large education loans, limits
the opportunities for newly-minted lawyers to employ their le-
gal skills.
The legal profession may be its own worst enemy in terms
of achieving success in challenging economic times. It has
been said that lawyers generally tend to be resistant to change
and that their inherent conservatism presents a major threat
to the success of the practice entities that they develop. 72 Ad-
ded to this is lawyers' general lack of experience and expertise
regarding how to operate a business.
To demonstrate the economic fragility of law firms in re-
cent years, one need only list the recent major law firm fail-
ures: Bingham McCutchen; Patton Boggs; Dewey LeBoeuf;
Howrey; Thelen; Heller Erhman; Drier; Brobeck, Phleger and
Harrison; Coudert Brothers; Finley Kumble. Each of these
were large, venerable, long-established law firms, or combina-
tions of venerable law firms, that failed as business enterprises
68. The 2000 Lawyer Statistical Report, 2005 AM. BAR FOUND 15.
69. Jake Simpson, Law360 Reveals 400 Largest US Firms, LAw360 (Mar.22,
2015, 4:00PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/631981/law360-reveals-
400-largest-us-firms.
70. Jeff Day, U.S. Law Firm Consolidation Accelerated in 2015, BLOOMBERG
BNA (Jan. 6, 2016) https://bol.bna.com/u-s-law-firm-consolidation-acceler-
ated-in-2015/.
71. See id.
72. 2015 Report on the State of the Legal Market, 2015 CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AT GEORGETOWN LAW & THOMSON REUTERS PEER
MONITORl3.
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to navigate the changes in the U.S. (and global) economy and
the impact of these changes on the legal services business
ecosystem. This lists only the most prominent failures, but
demonstrates that a marquee name and a long operating his-
tory matters little in today's economic marketplace.
B. Business Characteristics of Law Firms
Law firms, as enterprises, are professional- services busi-
nesses. Many in the hourly-rate dominated sector tend to be
operated fundamentally based on a "cash and carry" economic
model, with little accumulation of capital. The commercial as-
sets of a law firm built on an hourly-billing model are simply
the firm's current month's work in process and its ninety-day
receivables list. In general, law firms do not retain significant
earnings with which to weather downturns in the economy,
but instead deploy their cash currently to pay salaries, partner
draws, and current expenses.
The economic trend for these firms has not been robust.
During the ten years from early 2005 to late 2014, average law-
yer billing rates in the United States went from $304 per hour
to $473 per hour, a modest increase of 3.6% per annum. In
contrast, during this same period, law firm collection rates
dropped precipitously from an average of 92.7% of fees billed
to an average of 83%, representing a 10% drop in collection
and leaving about one of every five hours worked unpaid for.v3
In the face of these adverse economic indicators, since
2008 the demand for law firm litigation services defending or
prosecuting choses in action has been soft.7 4 During the years
following the 2008 economic downturn, while law firm collec-
tions dropped 10%, to 83% of billed time, the number of civil
cases filed in the fifty states', D.C. and Puerto Rico trial courts
saw a decline of 8%. This combination has had a severe impact
on many lawyers and law firms in the United States. 7 5
Less clear is the economic state of lawyers who do notjoin
large law firms. The historical tradition of lawyers as sole prac-
titioners or practicing in small group settings is still the pre-
dominant model in the United States but practicing litigation
73. Id. at 5.
74. Id. at 8.
75. Examining the Work of the State Courts, An Overview of State Court
Caseloads, 2013 COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS.
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in the small law firm setting is becoming increasingly unap-
pealing. Many small litigation practices serve the segment of
the market that cannot pay the enormous sums required to
pursue choses in action, and thus must adopt a contingent fee
model. Contingent fee attorneys who also need to fund case
costs, while at the same time make a profit, face hard choices.
Borrowing from banks to support lawsuits at modest interest
rates is, generally, no longer an option for them. 76 To the ex-
tent that traditional borrowing is available, it is limited in
amount. From the standpoint of the lawyer, such borrowing is
high-risk and unappealing because the lawyer is required to
repay the loan whether the case is won or lost. Some lawyers,
in an effort to stay solvent, are faced with the difficult choice
of rejecting worthy clients who cannot pay hourly fees or seek-
ing settlement of pending contingent fee cases in order to
generate the revenue needed to remain afloat. In the long
run, law firms that self-fund client cases have a limited finan-
cial ability to ensure access to justice, and therefore fall short
of achieving the objective of 'justice for all." In the context of
worthy choses in action and the high costs and risks of civil
justice, it was inevitable that natural forces in our free-market
economy would eventually reveal the need for non-party litiga-
tion funding.
Some lawyers faced with the lack of capital to fund choses
in action pursue careers outside of law practice, causing attri-
tion in the legal profession and thereby further reducing the
availability of representation and likelihood of attaining 'jus-
tice for all." The financial pressure faced by many young attor-
neys can be observed in the rising rate of law school loan de-
faults. 7 7 In fact, for a significant portion of the nation's attor-
neys, operating a private practice means living in a condition
76. SeeJacqueline Palank, Law Firms Are No Longer Seen as Safe Bet for Lend-
ers American Lawyer Report: Law Firms Consolidating at Record Setting Pace, WALL
ST.J. (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202731421434/
Report Law Firms Consolidating atRecord-Setting-Pace; Ashley Post, INsim
COUNSEL MAGAZINE, Banks increasingly wary of lending to law firms http://www
.americanlawyer.com/id=1202731421434/Report-Law-Firms-Consolidating-
at-Record-Setting-Pace (Apr. 30, 2012).
77. See William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School Bub-
ble: How Long Will It Last if Law Grads Can't Pay Bills? ABA Jouw4,kL, (Jan, 1,
2012) http://wwvv.abajournal.com/magazine/article/thelaw-school-bubble how_
long-wilit last if law grads-cant pay-bills;
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of financial distress.78 Students considering law as a profession
can readily observe the conditions of financial strain on law-
yers in private practice. 79 When considering whether to take
on substantial debt to pay law school tuition, these potential
law students would be remiss if they did not consider earning
opportunities post-graduation and their own ability to repay
the associated debt.s° What will happen to the legal profession
if the best and the brightest opt out of pursuing a legal career
due to the lack of available capital needed to represent the vast
majority of citizens who are unable to fund legal fees and costs
for their cases?
C. Lawyers as "Elevator Assets"
Lawyers themselves are the most precious and economi-,
cally fragile of law firm assets. In essence, a law firm is a collec-
tion of what we will call "Elevator Assets." Unless the lawyer
gets in the elevator to the office each day and invests the time
and intellect required to move a case forward, there is no as-
set. A lawsuit may potentially involve an enormous amount of
money and fees, but unless the lawyers engage in the daily
work of lawyering, the firm has no material assets.
Because of this "Elevator Asset" characteristic, a law firm
(large or small) is nothing more than a collection of individu-
als who make up the law firm's cadre of talent. All firm mem-
bers must trust that their partners will join them in the eleva-
tor each day to produce economic value for the law firm and
its clients. Unless that occurs, the law firm will surely fail.
During the past twenty years, a burgeoning industry of le-
gal recruiters and law firm merger consultants has emerged.
These businesses, as separate economic entities, generate reve-
nue by enticing successful and experienced lawyers to leave
their law firms for ostensibly greener pastures at a competing
firm. At many firms, calls to successful lawyers from recruiters
have become an annual ritual. Some lawyers heed the call
each year, taking clients with them, as well as the personal en-
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Elizabeth Olson, Burdened with Debt, Law School Graduates Struggle
in Job Market, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/
27/business/dealbook/burdened-with-debt-law-school-graduates-struggle-i n-
job-market.html.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
ergy and the intellect that the firm requires to maintain its
stability. This phenomenon has reduced law firm cohesiveness
and partner trust, and accounts in part for the list of long-
established firms that have failed.
We are taught to think of the practice of law as a profes-
sion-and indeed, it should be thought of this way. Whether
large or small, law firms are businesses. To thrive, a law prac-
tice must generate revenue that exceeds its expenses. Due to
the economic factors that have been discussed (and others), it
is increasingly necessary to understand principles of business
and basic accounting to avoid failure in the practice of law.
Sadly, while some law schools prepare students to deal with
business operations, many lawyers lack this kind of expertise.
This phenomenon is increasingly concerning now, when the
average law student graduates with a debt-load of $140,000,
and has fewer and fewer opportunities to earn enough money
to repay this debt and enjoy a standard of living that justifies
their investment of time and money.81
III.
CAPITAL-THE THIRD ECONOMIC ELEMENT
The third major economic element required to success-
fully maintain a chose in action in the civil justice system is
capital. What is the magnitude of the U.S. legal services market
today? It is estimated that the 1.3 million lawyers in the U.S.
generate a total of $400 billion in economic value annually.8 2
By comparison, the entire CPA profession generates approxi-
mately $90-$95 billion per annum from all its activities a8 and
the U.S. restaurant industry generates $709 billion per annum
in revenue. 84
Of the $400 billion of legal sector economic activity, ap-
proximately $250-275 billion is generated by private practice
81. See Editorial, The Law School Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct 24, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/opinion/sunday/the-law-school-
debt-crisis.html?_r=0; Olson, supra note 80.
82. Joshua Kubicki, Make That $400 Billion for U.S. Legal Market Size,
Legal Transformation Institute (Feb. 24, 2015), http://egaltransformation
institute.com/blog/2014/2/22/make-that400-billion-for-us.
83. Accounting Services in the US: Market Research Report, 2015 IBIsWORLD;
Statista.com November 2015.
84. NATIONAL RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, http://www.restaurant.org, (last
viewed Oct. 30, 2015).
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law firms, and roughly 18% of all law firm lawyers are engaged
in litigation.8 5 If we add to that figure sole practitioners and,
conservatively, round up the percentage to 20%, that would
make litigation a $60 billion annual market. If we add another
10% to cover experts and outside costs, a reasonable ballpark
for the cost of pursuing litigation alone is closer to $70 billion
per annum.8 6 By any measure, the magnitude of capital flow-
ing through private law practices makes it a significant eco-
nomic sector and the dollars allocated specifically to fund liti-
gation are enormous. Yet this sum falls well short of the
amount of capital the market requires to operate a fully func-
tional and fair civil litigation system capable of offering 'justice
for all."
Despite the enormous scale of the litigation market today,
the fees and costs required to maintain a lawsuit make civil
justice unattainable for ordinary citizens. Today, in significant
commercial litigation, costs of $100,000 per month are com-
monplace and bills of $1 million per month are not rare. Al-
though it is not easy to find data on attorneys' fees in private
litigation matters, the data we cite is based upon actual case
information that we have had access to in the course of litiga-
tion funding. Publicly available data supports these findings.
The litigation seeking personal injury damages for first re-
sponders and cleanup personnel after the 9/11 World Trade
Center attacks generated defendants' attorneys' fees of over
$200 million for hourly-rate attorneys, and similar sums for the
contingent fee plaintiffs attorneys.87 The attorneys' fees award
for the Securities, Derivative and ERISA claims for In re Enron
Corp. was $688 million. In August 2012, the Delaware Supreme
Court awarded $300 million in attorneys' fees for a law firm
that successfully pursued a shareholder derivative suit.88 While
not often a matter of public record, it is most likely that the
fees paid on an hourly basis to defendants' lawyers in cases
such as this can approach the boxcar numbers being awarded
85. Kubicki, supra note 82.
86. Law Firms in the US: Market Research Report, 2015 IBISWORLD; Legal Ser-
vices Industry Profile, FIRST RESEARCH 8/10/2015; Joshua Kubicki, Report 2/24/
2014, 2014 LEGAL TRANSFORMATION INSTITUTE.
87. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litigation, 514 F. Supp. 2d 556
(S.D.N.Y 2007).
88. Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012).
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plaintiffs' counsel in very large class action, securities and mass
tort cases.
Though engaging in the civil justice system is a capital-
intensive endeavor, when law firms earn profits they generally
do not retain them to build up capital. For most businesses, a
common means of raising needed capital is selling equity and
sharing revenue with a financier. Rules 5.4(b) and (d) of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which have been
adopted in similar form in all fifty states, prohibit ownership of
law firms by non-lawyers and fee-sharing with non-lawyers.8 9
One limited exception is the District of Columbia, which per-
mits non-lawyers to become equity owners if they work in the
law firm in support of the law firm's business.90 These self-im-
posed professional constraints on capital acquisition present
an institutional impediment for law firms that want to raise
capital from external sources.
Unsurprisingly, the U.S. capitalist marketplace has gener-
ated a variety of partial solutions to the capital constraints fac-
ing owners of choses in action and their lawyers. 91 Some of
these solutions have become commonplace.
A. The Contingent Fee
The initial acceptance and persistence of the contingent
fee was and remains founded upon four principles:
To the extent that lawyers are sufficiently capitalized to
fund their law practices and lawsuits over the long, slow pro-
cess of civil litigation in the United States, the contingent fee
provides access to the legal system for clients who have good
claims but who are unable to pay the many thousands (or mil-
lions) of dollars in required legal fees and case costs. The obvi-
ous limitation of the contingent fee as a capital source is the
89. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT rr. 5.4(b) & (d) (AM. BAR ASS'N
2013).
90. Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 5.4-Professional Independence of a
Lawyer, D.C. BAR https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/amen
ded-rules/rule5-04.cfm (Apr. 17, 2016).
91. The increasing capital requirements of civil litigation are made worse
by the manner in which legal expenses are treated in the United States Liti-
gants in the United States are ultimately liable for the costs they incur, even
if they win, absent a specific statutory or contractual cost-shifting provision.
In contrast, under the "English Rule," prevailing parties are entitled to re-
cover legal expenses from their adversaries.
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limited capacity of most qualified lawyers to offer this option
to many clients.
For young lawyers, who, as noted, may have emerged from
law school with $140,000 in education loans, amassing the cap-
ital needed to offer clients a contingent fee option without
themselves going deeper into debt is out of the question. It
takes many years for most trial lawyers to be in the financial
position to offer contingent fee options, if ever, except for the
simplest small-ticket cases. This economic need is starting to
be addressed by the capitalist system, as specialty funding com-
panies have begun to emerge. These companies are willing to
offer law firm financing secured by the estimated value of a
lawyer's portfolio of contingent fee cases.
Unlike the hourly rate model, the contingency fee attor-
ney-client arrangement aligns the economic incentives of both
the lawyer and the client. As in any economic venture for gain
or profit, aligning the interests of the principal and agent
makes for more rational decisions. By comparison, a law firm
billing by the hour has a rational economic incentive to make
more money by doing more work and charging higher fees,
regardless of whether all of the work benefits the client. This
misalignment is eliminated with a contingency fee. Misalign-
ment is also a reason why clients are more frequently insisting
on a blended fee agreement, in which an hourly fee that is
significantly lower than the firm's normal rate is paid, but an
incentive fee is available to the lawyer for achieving agreed-
upon targets in the outcome of the litigation.
The lawyer agreeing to take a case on a full or partial con-
tingency serves a gatekeeper function for the civil justice sys-
tem. Contingency fees tend to eliminate the pursuit of claims
that are not economically significant or that lack clear merit
because the lawyer will not take on a case that is not antici-
pated to be economically successful.
Permitting a contingency fee is a healthy economic op-
tion for the successful functioning of a capitalist marketplace.
Freedom to contract is an essential element in achieving the
most efficient economic outcome.
B. The Advent of Liability Insurance
Another answer to the increasing demand for capital in
the growing industrial economy after the Civil War was the de-
velopment of liability insurance in the civil justice system. Non-
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existent in the United States prior to the first employer policy
issued in 1886,92 liability insurance has rapidly grown in preva-
lence and is now tightly woven into the legal and economic
fabric of our culture and our civil justice system. Not unlike
the contingent fee contract and other non-party litigation
funding, the common law's acceptance of the negligence in-
surance policy was controversial and occurred only after signif-
icant judicial debate. In addition to the historic prohibition
under the doctrine of maintenance, the debate largely cen-
tered on theories of whether insurance, by removing the
threat of liability and actual liability for the defendant's ac-
tions, frustrated the tort law goals of deterrence (by eroding
the likelihood of penalty for dangerous behavior) and fairness
(by re-allocating losses away from the actual negligent party).93
The Missouri Supreme Court fully articulated the debate
in Breeden v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Insurance
Company.94 In that case, the defendant insurance company had
issued a liability policy to plaintiff Breeden's employer, the Big
Circle Mining Company. Breeden injured himself while at
work, and sued Big Circle for $5000 in damages. Frankfort de-
fended the suit per the terms of its contract with Big Circle.
Breeden obtained a judgment in the amount of $2500, Frank-
fort/Big Circle appealed, and a new trial was ordered. After
the second trial, Breeden obtained a $3500judgment, but dur-
ing the intervening appeal and retrial, Big Circle had become
insolvent. Frankfort ended up buying the judgment for $1000.
Breeden then sued Frankfort for wrongfully maintaining Big
Circle in the personal injury suit.95
Regarding the validity of the insurance contract, the two-
judge "minority' 96 view would have refused to enforce the
agreement, and vigorously asserted the dire consequences of
92. Gary T. Schwartz, Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75
CORNELL L. REv. 313, 314 (1990) (citing C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR., INSURANCE
ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 3-4 (1969)).
93. See id. at 314-15.
94. Breeden v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 119
S.W. 576 (Mo. 1909).
95. Id. at 576-78.
96. Interestingly, Breeden is often cited in support of the enforceability of
tort liability insurance contracts, even though the suit was actually resolved
in the insurer's favor on the basis of the ultimate settlement for $1000 be-
tween it and the plaintiff. Id. at 605.
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removing liability from the negligent party. It analogized to
the duties of a carrier to a passenger, and reasoned that to any
extent an insurance fund is essentially "substituted for the like
sum" of the insured, "the financial responsibility of the carrier
is reduced to the same extent, and the corresponding degree
of care required of him to be exercised in favor of the passen-
ger is likewise reduced to the same degree."97
The five-judge majority noted the need for limiting the
scope of maintenance in order to "adapt to the new order of
things in the present highly progressive and commercial
age,"9 8 and concluded that "the interference of defendant [in-
surance company] in the litigation between Breeden and the
mining company was not maintenance as that term is used in
the law." 99 In addition, the contract was determined to not af-
fect the ultimate placement of liability, and hence did not dis-
turb the aims of tort law:
"Such insurance does not lessen the employer's liability or
responsibility, but increases his means of meeting both ...
[and] despite such [an] indemnity contract, the liability of the
master to the servant, and the carrier to the passenger or ship-
per, for negligence, is neither directly or by implication im-
pugned, impaired, abridged, or whittled away, but remains in
full flower and vigor precisely as it was before the insur-
ance." 00
The arguments articulated by the seven justices in Breeden
are reflective of ajudicial system coming to grips with a capital-
ist economy's novel solution-defendant-side liability insur-
ance contracts-to a growing impediment to business. And to
a large degree, it mirrors the debate surrounding today's novel
solutions-various forms of plaintiff-side litigation funding-
to the growing impediment to court access. In that debate, as-
sertions abound over the effect these new sources of capital for
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers will have.
Some critics have asserted that non-party litigation con-
tracts impugn the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship, a
bedrock of the civil justice system. 10 1 To assess how non-party
97. Id. at 582.
98. Id. at 606.
99. Id. at 608.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., John H. Beisner & Gary A. Rubin, Stapping the Sale on Law-
suits: A Proposal to Regulate Non-Party Investments In Litigation, 2012 U.S. CHAM-
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litigation funding can affect the attorney-client relationship, it
is instructive to compare and contrast its typical manifestation
in the case of liability insurance. Similarities include the trian-
gle relationship amongst the parties to these funding mecha-
nisms (plaintiff, counsel and insurer/funder) as well as their
shared raison d'etre (insurer protects from loss; funder aids in
recovery of lOSS).102 However, an important difference be-
tween liability insurers and plaintiff-side funders includes the
role that each may play in the litigation. Insurers typically have
complete control through a right and duty to defend, and that
control extends to the choice of counsel and complete domin-
ion over settlement decisions within policy limits. 103 Signifi-
cantly, the insurer's control can encompass access to privi-
leged information.10 4 Judicial sanction of the insured's com-
plete alienation of control in litigation has roots as far back as
the sanction of the tort liability contract, 10 5 and has become
even more entrenched since. 106
BER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM 1-2, http://www.instituteforlegalreform
.com/uploads/sites/i/TPLFSolutions.pdf (asserting that non-party litiga-
tion funding "undercuts plaintiff and lawyer control over litigation" and will
"diminish the professional independence of attorneys").
102. Bentham IMF Litigation Funding Roundtable: Key Issues and Best Practices,
2014 BENTHAM IMF 8, available at http://www.benthamimf.com/ docs/de-
fault source/default document librar)'/bentham report final 10 01
14.pdPsfvrsn=2 [hereinafter Bentham IMF] (describing a mirror relation-
ship between liability insurance and plaintiff side litigation funding).
103. Id.
104. Generally, courts recognize an exception to the wavier of privilege
based on non-party disclosure where the interests of the insured and insurer
align. See, e.g., Glacier Gen. Assurance Co. v. Superior Court. of L.A. Cty., 95
Cal. App. 3d 838, 842 (1979) (stating "when an insurer, as required by its
contract of insurance, employs counsel to defend its insured, any communi-
cation with the lawyer concerning the handling of the claim against the in-
sured, is necessarily a matter of common interest to both the insured and
the insurer"). Accordingly, the disclosure of privileged information in the
circumstance where the insurer accepts a tendered defense without a reser-
vation of rights does not constitute a waiver of the privilege.
105. See, e.g., Breeden, 119 S.W. at 608 (endorsing the proposition that "the
clause in the policy of insurance permitting the insurer to have charge of a
case in court, and forbidding a settlement at the initiative of the insured,
relates only to the liability of the insurance company to the insured, and in
no way forbids a settlement with the injured party, if the insured dcsires to
take such course independently of his contract").
106. See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. 1987) (en
banc) (stating how the insurer has the right to "evaluate claims and decide
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Non-party, plaintiff-side litigation funders do not typically
contract for such control over the litigation in which they in-
vest. 10 7 In fact, refraining from "intermeddling" in litigation is
generally a required condition for exception from cham-
perty,'08 and litigation funders, for both practical and com-
mercial reasons, do not typically seek control. 10 9 Moreover, liti-
gation funders do not generally (and, in the view of the au-
thors, should not) have access to privileged information," 0
and, therefore, do not typically seek it."'
These apparent "double standards" applied to liability in-
surers and non-party plaintiff-side litigation funders have led
Professor Anthony Sebok to ask the following question: should
we be so concerned about the possible alienation or assign-
whether to settle," "make economic decisions without the assent of the in-
3ured," and "decidc what to spend in defense, what discovery is to be had,
and what experts to hire"); Hurvitz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 109 Cal.
App. 4th 918 (2003) (dismissing an action against an insurer who entered a
global settlement over the insured's objection, that included tendered
claims as well as claim for which insurer did not provide an attorney to in-
sured).
107. Bentham IMF, supra note 102, at 8.
108. Anthonyj. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REv. 61, 109-12
(2011). See also Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 725
(contrasting "officious intermeddling" with a funder "sought out by a cash-
strapped litigant embroiled in bitterly contested litigation").
109. See, e.g., LFG Code of Ethics, LAW FINANCE GRP., http://www.lawfinance
.com/about-us/social-purpose/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2015) (stating "[w]e en-
sure that the attorney and client retain complete control of their case.");
Letter from Juridica Capital Mgmt. Inc. to Am. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics
20/20 (Feb. 17, 2011), in COMMENTS: ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING
WORKING GROUP ISSUES PAPER, 66-72, http://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ethics_2020/comments-on alterna
tivejlitigation-financing-issuespaper.authcheckdam.pdf (stating "[w]e do
not seek to control any of the decisions regarding the conduct of any litiga-
tion that we finance, nor are we aware of any other funder in this market
segment that does").
110. See Caterpillar, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 732 (holding that common interest
doctrine does not except disclosure to non-party funder from waiver of the
attorney-client privilege because a shared "rooting" interest in the outcome
of the case is not a shared legal interest).
111. Significantly, the lack of access to privileged communications exacer
bates the information gap that disadvantages singular plaintiffs and their
counsel with respect to corporate defendants and insurance companies that
have a data bank of similar claims from which to draw important lessons and
successful strategies.
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ment of control to litigation funders? 12 Raising this question
illuminates the evolution of non-party, plaintiff-side litigation
funding as a more widely-accepted means of surmounting the
lack of capital in our justice system.
C. The Capitalist Economic Marketplace as Source
of Litigation Funding
Given the U.S. civil justice system's voracious appetite for
capital, various types of players have offered risk capital in the
economic marketplace. Despite recent publicity identifying
non-party litigation funding as a new phenomenon, it has
been in existence in the U.S. for many years. Syndication of
litigation claims were pursued at least thirty years ago, when a
group of investors formed Micro/Vest, a partnership to pursue
litigation to enforce a contract against ComputerLand Corpo-
ration. Later, a group of investors formed NTP to enforce pat-
ent claims against RIM Corporation.
Over the past twenty years, specialty finance businesses
have begun to emerge, seeking to address the unmet need for
funding of choses in action. They have offered loans to law
firms secured by contingency cases, loans to lawyers secured by
delayed settlement payments, investments in judgments on ap-
peal, and loans to clients providing funds to pay hourly rate
legal fees, among others. It remains a dynamic and increas-
ingly competitive marketplace, though it still has not achieved
maturity and economic efficiency. As in any emerging market
in a capitalist economy, it is most likely to achieve the capital
needs of owners of choses in action and the legal profession if
allowed to mature without unnecessary outside constraints.
That is not to suggest that legal issues, such as case control and
protection of attorney-client privilege, should not be ad-
dressed. It does suggest, however, that to the extent market
forces of the U.S. capitalist economy are free to work, the ben-
efits to the functioning of the civil justice system will be en-
hanced.
112. Anthony Sebok, Private Dollars for Public Litigation: An Introduction, 12
N.Y.U.J.L. & Bus. __ (Special Issue 2016).
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CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS
Due to the current high cost of the civil justice system and
the lack of sufficient capital, the guaranteed right to trial by
jury and chose in action property rights are on the road to
becoming an anachronism. If the United States wishes to maxi-
mize economic success and to live its pledge of 'justice for all,"
it must acknowledge the economic requirement of capital and
enable the capitalist economy to develop the funding sources
needed to afford equal access to justice. Non-party litigation
funding is nothing more or less than the U.S. economic system
at work producing a solution to an economic shortage.
It is understandable that those players in the economy
who control large concentrations of wealth and power are not
cheerleaders for the developments in litigation finance that
are the capitalist economy's response to the financial imbal-
ance affecting access to civil justice. Clearly, the threat of ena-
bling all owners of choses in action access to justice has moved
some to pursue efforts intended to prevent or limit plaintiffs
from attaining economic parity in a civil justice contest. What
is interesting is that many of this group, having achieved great
wealth as a financial reward for success in our capitalist econ-
omy, are very unhappy when that same economy offers equal
access to those wishing to compete with them in resolving an
economic dispute.
Given the inherent fragility of the legal profession as a
business and its enormous scale in the overall U.S. economy,
the development of capital sources specializing in funding law-
yers and law firms should be encouraged by the legal profes-
sion. One is struck by the duality of the legal profession, partic-
ularly in the litigation context. For every lawyer pursuing a
case in the civil justice system on behalf of a plaintiff there is at
least one, and maybe more than one, lawyer engaged to de-
fend that same case. To the extent that access to justice is con-
strained and fewer cases are filed or maintained to their con-
clusion due to a lack of capital on the plaintiffs' side, the ad-
verse economic impact is equal or greater on those lawyers
who earn a living defending against such claims. This systemic,
symbiotic relationship between the lawyers on each side of a
legal dispute seems to be lost on many of the lawyers who are
directly affected by it. One wonders why all lawyers, whether
traditionally plaintiff-oriented or defendant-oriented, are not
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loud voices in a choir singing the benefits of assuring neces-
sary capital is available to each side of the dispute to pursue
civil justice for choses in action.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business
[Vol. 12:635
